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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Appellant Manny Baker, a Pennsylvania state parolee, 
was arrested while leaving the parole office for violating the 
condition of his parole that required him to refrain from 
driving. Parole officers searched the passenger 
compartment of the borrowed car that Baker had driven to 
the parole office. They also searched the trunk of the car 
and discovered what they believed to be drug 
paraphernalia. On the basis of what they found in the 
trunk, the officers searched Baker's home, where they 
found weapons and 66 grams of heroin. A federal grand 
jury indicted Baker for possessing with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance (heroin) in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(a)(1), and for violating the statutes prohibiting felons 
from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g)(1) & 924(a). 
Before trial, Baker moved to suppress the evidence seized 
from his home, but the District Court denied his 
suppression motion. Baker proceeded to trial, where he was 
convicted of violating SS 841(a)(1) and 922 (g)(1) and 
sentenced to almost twenty years imprisonment on 
weapons and drugs charges. 
 
This appeal which, as we shall explain below, is now in 
its third discrete phase, raises an important first- 
impression question: whether the standard Pennsylvania 
Board of Probation and Parole consent to search form, 
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signed by Baker as a condition of his parole, authorized 
suspicionless searches of his person, property, and 
residence. Before reaching this question, we will explain our 
previous conclusions--memorialized in an unrequited 
certification to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court--that 
Baker had standing to object to the search of the vehicle, 
which he did not own, and that the parole officers lacked 
reasonable suspicion to search the trunk of that car. These 
holdings are the predicate for the question whether the 
consent to search form authorized suspicionless searches 
because, if Baker lacked standing to object to the search, or 
if the officers had reasonable suspicion, we could dispose of 
the case without construing the consent form. 
 
The consent to search form provided: 
 
       I expressly consent to the search of my person, 
       property and residence, without a warrant by agents of 
       the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. Any 
       items, in possession of which constitutes a violation of 
       the parole/reparole shall be subject to seizure, and 
       may be used as evidence in the parole revocation 
       process. 
 
If as a matter of Pennsylvania law the standard consent to 
search form implies a requirement that parole officers have 
reasonable suspicion in order to conduct a search of a 
parolee, the evidence against Baker must be suppressed 
and his conviction set aside. Because we conclude that the 
form should be so construed (or more precisely, predict that 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would so construe it), 
the order of the District Court denying Baker's motion to 
suppress will be reversed. 
 
I. 
 
In August 1996, Baker drove to the state parole office in 
Philadelphia for a scheduled visit with his parole officer. As 
a condition of his parole, Baker had agreed not to drive 
without a license. During the parole visit, a parole agent 
asked Baker if he had a driver's license, and Baker 
responded that he did not. When Baker attempted to drive 
away after his visit, he was arrested by parole officers for 
violating this condition of parole. 
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After Baker was arrested, parole officers searched the 
passenger compartment and the glove compartment of the 
car that Baker had been driving and discovered that the car 
was registered in someone else's name. The officers could 
not figure out how to open the trunk of the car. One of 
them asked Baker, then in custody at the parole office, how 
to open the trunk. Baker explained that the engine must be 
turned on to open the trunk and gave the officer the keys 
to the trunk.1 Once the parole officers got into the trunk, 
they found what they suspected was drug paraphernalia: 
"several screw top glass vials, oils, empty clear plastic 
lunch bags and taller incense bags." The officers then 
conducted a warrantless search of Baker's home, which 
yielded numerous weapons and sixty-six grams of heroin. 
As we have noted, the District Court found that this search 
was justified by the reasonable suspicion that arose from 
the items discovered in the car and denied Baker's motion 
to suppress evidence. This appeal followed. 
 
In a prior opinion, United States v. Baker, No. 97-1977 
(3d Cir. Jan. 7, 1999), we ordered a limited remand for the 
District Court to consider whether Baker had standing to 
challenge the search of the car and whether there was 
reasonable suspicion to justify the search of the trunk of 
the car. On remand, United States v. Baker, No. 97-00297 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 1999), the District Court concluded that 
Baker had standing and that the parole officers had 
reasonable suspicion to search the trunk of the car. In the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In a letter brief filed after the first stage of this appeal, the 
government 
advanced the following theory of consent for thefirst time: 
 
       the defendant consented to the search and seizure of his bag from 
       the trunk of the car when he identified the bag as his and 
       instructed the parole agent in how to open the trunk. Scheckloth v. 
       Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search must be 
       voluntary, but the government is not obliged to prove that the 
       suspect was warned of any right to refuse consent). 
 
Appellee's Letter Br., Nov. 27, 1998. As the government did not make 
this argument in the District Court and did not renew it in its brief 
following remand, and as Baker timely objected that the argument had 
been waived in his response to the government's letter brief, see 
Appellant's Response to Appellee's Letter Br., Dec. 1, 1998, we will not 
consider this argument on appeal. 
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wake of the District Court's opinion, the appeal presented 
three questions: (1) whether Baker had standing to 
challenge the search of the car; (2) whether there was 
reasonable suspicion to search the trunk of the car that 
Baker drove to the parole office; and (3) if there was not 
reasonable suspicion, whether the search of the trunk was 
still valid because of the consent form that Baker signed 
upon his release on parole.2 
 
Following receipt of supplemental briefing and additional 
argument, the panel conferred and concluded that: (1) 
Baker had standing to challenge the search of the car; and 
(2) that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to search the 
trunk of the car. On February 18, 2000, we certified to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court (pursuant to Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court Order No. 197, Judicial Administration, 
Docket No. 1, filed Jan. 12, 2000) the remaining--and 
vexing--question whether, under Pennsylvania law, the 
consent form authorized suspicionless searches. 
 
The Supreme Court did not accept our petition for 
certification, leaving us to determine whether, under that 
Court's opinions in Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & 
Parole, 698 A.2d 32 (Pa. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 524 
U.S. 357 (1998), and Commonwealth v. Williams , 692 A.2d 
1031 (Pa. 1997), the consent to search form used by the 
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, as a matter of 
Pennsylvania law, authorizes suspicionless searches or 
implies a condition that any search conducted pursuant to 
the consent form be founded on reasonable suspicion. 
 
II. 
 
The threshold question presented by these facts is that of 
standing. Standing to challenge a search requires that the 
individual challenging the search have a reasonable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In the first stage of the appeal, Baker also claimed that the District 
Court erred in "failing to recognize its authority to depart from the 
career 
offender status on the grounds that the appellant's criminal history 
status seriously overrepresented his past conduct and significantly 
differed from the heartland." On remand, the District Court clarified that 
it was fully aware of its authority to depart on this ground, and Baker 
makes no argument on this issue at this time. 
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expectation of privacy in the property searched, see Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978), and that he manifest 
a subjective expectation of privacy in the property searched, 
see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988). 
 
It is clear that a passenger in a car that he neither owns 
nor leases typically has no standing to challenge a search 
of the car. See Rakas, 439 U.S. 133-34 (holding that there 
is no legitimacy to a defendant's expectations of privacy 
where the area searched is in the control of a third party). 
"Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, which, like 
some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously 
asserted." Id. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 
394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). "A person who is aggrieved by an 
illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of 
damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's 
premises or property has not had any of his Fourth 
Amendment rights infringed." Id. at 134. 
 
For these reasons, we have previously suggested that a 
defendant who had stolen a car and used it in a robbery 
would not have standing to object to a search of the car. 
See United States v. Yeager, 448 F.2d 74, 85 (3d Cir. 1971) 
(rejecting challenge to search on basis that "if[the 
defendant's] theories were valid, a stolen car used in a 
robbery could not be searched and objects therein seized by 
the police without a search warrant"). We have never 
considered, however, whether an individual who borrows a 
car and has control over it has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in it. 
 
Cases from other circuits suggest that whether the driver 
of a car has the reasonable expectation of privacy necessary 
to show Fourth Amendment standing is a fact-bound 
question dependent on the strength of his interest in the 
car and the nature of his control over it; ownership is not 
necessary. Compare United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 
1394, 1398-99 (11th Cir. 1998) (driver of a rental car whose 
contract to rent the car had expired four days before the 
search had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car 
because he could have extended the contract with a simple 
phone call); United States v. Angulo-Fernandez , 53 F.3d 
1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1995) (driver who was able to 
produce registration papers in the name of the person from 
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whom he claimed to have borrowed the car had standing); 
United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1275 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (permission from the owner to use a vehicle 
supports privacy expectation therein); United States v. 
Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1417-18 (7th Cir. 1990) (driver 
using vehicle with the permission of an absent owner has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy therein); with United 
States v. Padilla, 111 F.3d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(defendants lacked standing to object to the search of car in 
which they had only a temporary "bailment interest"); 
United States v. Riazco, 91 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(defendant lacked standing to object to the search of a 
rental car in a case in which his name was not on the 
rental agreement, the rental agreement had expired, and 
the defendant did not have permission to drive the car from 
the person who rented the car); United States v. Wellons, 32 
F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (driver of a rental car did not 
have standing to contest the search thereof because he was 
not listed as an authorized driver on the rental contract); 
United States v. Ponce, 947 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(defendant must show legitimate basis for possessing a car, 
such as permission from the car owner, to have standing); 
United States v. Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 113-14 (1st Cir. 
1991) (because defendant failed either to show that he had 
the owner's permission to use the car or to demonstrate 
prior use or control of the car, the circumstances tipped in 
favor of denying the motion to suppress). 
 
Baker is asserting his own, not a third party's, 
expectation of privacy. He came alone in the car to the 
parole office. Although he did not own the car, he had 
substantial control over it insofar as he had borrowed it 
from a friend and had been driving it for four to six weeks. 
He carried the keys to the car with him into the parole 
office. Although the defendant and his associates were 
somewhat vague about who owned the car, there is no 
evidence in the record that the car was stolen or that Baker 
knowingly possessed a stolen car. All of these factors lead 
to the conclusion that Baker had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the car. In Angulo-Fernandez, 53 F.3d at 1179, 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the 
argument that the defendant lacked standing because the 
registered owner, from whom a defendant claimed to have 
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borrowed the car, denied ownership. The court held that 
"[t]he officer's testimony established that Mr. Angulo- 
Fernandez had claimed to have borrowed the car from the 
rightful owner and had produced a registration bearing the 
owner's name. Although such evidence may not be 
determinative of the Defendant's right to possess the car, 
absent evidence to the contrary, it is sufficient to meet his 
burden of demonstrating Fourth Amendment standing." Id. 
Similarly, in Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1418, the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit held that a driver who borrowed a 
car (but was unable to provide the last name of the owner) 
had standing to object to the search because "[i]f an 
individual has the owner's permission to use property, 
society surely recognizes this as reasonable." (citation 
omitted). 
 
We conclude that a discrepancy between an individual's 
statement regarding the owner of the car he is driving, and 
the identity of the owner of the car as reflected by the title 
and registration, is not enough, by itself, to destroy the 
driver's reasonable expectation of privacy when there is 
clear evidence of continuing possession and control, as well 
as no evidence that the driver obtained the car 
illegitimately. Under the circumstances, therefore, Baker 
had the requisite legitimate expectation of privacy to 
support standing for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
 
III. 
 
Given that Baker has standing to challenge the search, 
the next question is whether the District Court erred in 
concluding that the parole agent had reasonable suspicion 
to search the trunk of the car. Though officers may lawfully 
search the passenger compartment of the car incident to 
arrest, see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) 
(holding that, when a policeman has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, 
as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile), such a search 
incident to arrest does not extend to the trunk of the car, 
see id. at 460-61& n.4. Thus, in order for the search of the 
trunk to comport with the Fourth Amendment, it had to 
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have been supported by the level of suspicion required 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
Under normal circumstances, the Fourth Amendment 
requires government officials to have both probable cause 
and a warrant to conduct a search. In the case of parolees, 
however, the requisite level of suspicion is reduced and a 
warrant is not required. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 
868, 871-72 (1987), a Wisconsin statute authorized 
probation officers to conduct warrantless searches of 
probationers' homes when there were "reasonable grounds" 
to believe that contraband would be found there. The Court 
found that the operation of a state's probation system 
presented "special needs," beyond the need for law 
enforcement, justifying an exception to the warrant and 
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
See id. at 873-74. The Court noted: 
 
       To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of 
       probationers (as we have said it to be true of parolees) 
       that they do not enjoy "the absolute liberty to which 
       every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty 
       properly dependent on observance of special 
       [probation] restrictions." 
 
Id. at 874 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 480 
(1972)) (omission and alterations in original). The Court 
went on to hold that the special needs of the probation 
system, including the need to supervise probationers, see 
id. at 875, justified a lower standard for searches of a 
probationer's property, see id. at 878. Specifically, the 
Court held that a search could be conducted on the basis 
of such "reasonable grounds" as information indicating that 
there might be weapons in a probationer's home. See id. at 
880. 
 
In United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902, 909 (3d Cir. 1992), 
we extended the holding in Griffin to parolees and 
concluded that a parolee's car or home can be searched on 
the basis of reasonable suspicion alone, even in the 
absence of an authorizing state statute such as that in 
Griffin. In Hill, the defendant was arrested for violating 
parole. His apartment was then searched and two guns 
were seized. See 967 F.2d at 904-05. We affirmed the 
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district court's denial of Hill's motion to suppress the guns, 
concluding that "parole may be an even more severe 
restriction on liberty because the parolee has already been 
adjudged in need of incarceration." Id. at 909. Quoting 
Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1975), we 
noted that "parole authorities have a `special and unique 
interest in invading the privacy of parolees under their 
supervision.' " Hill, 967 F.2d at 910."[I]t is reasonable to 
allow a parole officer to search whenever he reasonably 
believes that it is necessary to perform his duties. The 
decision to search must be based on `specific facts,' but the 
officer need not possess probable cause." See id.; see also 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that 
reasonable suspicion requires "specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion" of a warrantless 
search). 
 
In Hill, the officers acted on a report from the parolee's 
estranged wife that he had committed several parole 
violations, including keeping drugs and guns in the home 
that they jointly owned. See 967 F.2d at 904, 911. We 
concluded that these facts were specific enough to give rise 
to reasonable suspicion. We also rejected Hill's argument 
that, once he was arrested, any special need justifying a 
lower standard vanished, concluding that "the parole 
agents' `interest in inspecting [Hill's] place of residence did 
not terminate upon his arrest; if anything, it intensified.' " 
Id. at 911 (quoting Latta, 521 F.2d at 252); see also United 
States v. Jones, 152 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
the argument that "the State's special supervisory need is 
diminished when a parolee is in custody"). 
 
Following remand in this case, the District Court 
concluded that the search of the trunk was lawful because 
(1) Baker had no driver's license (which was a violation of 
his parole); (2) Baker could not produce documentation 
demonstrating that he owned the car; and (3) the parole 
officer might reasonably have concluded that Baker"might 
have been in further violation of his parole (the car might 
have been stolen) or that the trunk of the car might contain 
evidence of a further violation of his parole such as drug 
paraphernalia." 
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We disagree that there was justification to search the 
trunk. The parole officers' actions were not based on 
"specific facts" giving rise to suspicion that there would be 
some evidence of a further violation of parole in the trunk. 
In Hill, the parole officers acted pursuant to information 
regarding specific allegations of parole violations. See Hill, 
967 F.2d at 911. Here, by contrast, there were no similar 
allegations. There is no evidence in the record that the 
parole agents who searched Baker's trunk had yet 
discovered the inconsistencies between the title/registration 
and Baker's statements regarding the ownership of the car 
when they searched the trunk.3 Even if they had, we do not 
think that a mere suspicion that a car might be stolen 
justifies a search of the trunk of that car: There is little 
reason to think evidence of the car's rightful owner would 
be found in the trunk.4 
 
Similarly, neither Baker's violation of his parole by 
driving a vehicle or his failure to document that he owned 
the vehicle can give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he 
was committing other, unspecified, unrelated parole 
violations--the evidence of which might be found in the 
trunk. Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998) 
("Once [the defendant] was stopped for speeding and issued 
a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that 
offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive 
speed was going to be found either on the person of the 
offender or in the passenger compartment of the car." ). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court found that, before the parole agent searched the 
trunk, he knew that "the defendant could not produce documents 
demonstrating that he owned the car." However, Agent Knorr testified 
that the relevant portions of the conversation regarding the ownership of 
the car occurred after the agents searched the trunk. See App. at 28a 
("Q: After you searched the trunk you returned to your office, is that 
right? A: Yes. Q: And when you went back inside did you have a 
conversation with anyone? A: I asked Mr. Baker who owned the vehicle 
. . ."). 
 
4. The officer testified that, when he conducted a title search, he 
learned 
that the car was not listed as a stolen vehicle. See App. at 37a ("Q: 
There 
is no evidence at all that the vehicle was stolen, correct? A: When I ran 
it it was not on the computer listed as stolen but the name did not 
match the person who was in possession of it."). 
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Reasonable suspicion requires more specificity than these 
parole officers had in this case. Thus, we are satisfied that 
the search of the trunk was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion. The evidence procured in the search of the trunk 
and the house must therefore be suppressed as the fruits 
of an illegal search unless the consent form provided a 
basis for the search. 
 
IV. 
 
The parties agree that the proper construction of the 
consent form that Baker signed turns on two cases decided 
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 692 A.2d 1031 (Pa. 1997), and Scott v. 
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 698 A.2d 32 (Pa. 
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 524 U.S. 357 (1998). Baker 
contends that under these precedents the consent form 
that he signed must be construed as a matter of 
Pennsylvania law to imply a condition that the parole 
officers have reasonable suspicion to justify any search of 
his person, property, or residence. If Baker is correct, the 
evidence procured in the search of the house must be 
suppressed because the consent form he signed did not 
authorize searches in the absence of reasonable suspicion. 
 
The United States disagrees, contending that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's resolution of Williams and 
Scott rested on federal constitutional grounds rather than 
the proper construction of the Pennsylvania consent form. 
More specifically, the government submits that these cases 
hold that an unqualified consent to search executed as a 
condition of parole can justify a search consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment only where reasonable suspicion is 
present, but do not decide whether--under Pennsylvania 
law--the form should be construed to provide unqualified 
consent to search. Since we are not bound by 
Pennsylvania's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 
this reading of Williams and Scott would leave us free to 
construe the forms anew. 
 
We agree with the government that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has never directly construed the form as a 
matter of Pennsylvania law. Nevertheless, as we shall 
 
                                12 
  
explain, although we believe that it is arguable that the 
form waives the reasonable suspicion requirement, Williams 
and Scott strongly suggest that Pennsylvania would 
construe the form to preserve the reasonable suspicion 
requirement. 
 
In Williams, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed a 
parolee's claim that a search conducted pursuant to a 
consent form identical to the one at issue here violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights.5 The Court analyzed the 
conflicting interests involved in the case, the relevant 
precedents (state and federal, including Griffin), and the 
approaches taken by other states, and adopted the 
approach that: 
 
       the parolee's signing of a parole agreement giving his 
       parole officer permission to conduct a warrantless 
       search does not mean either that the parole officer can 
       conduct a search at any time and for any reason or 
       that the parolee relinquishes his Fourth Amendment 
       right to be free from unreasonable searches. Rather, 
       the parolee's signature acts as acknowledgment that 
       the parole officer has a right to conduct reasonable 
       searches of his residence listed on the parole 
       agreement without a warrant. 
 
Id. at 1036. 
 
Significantly, the approach adopted requires a court to 
conduct what amounts to a Fourth Amendment analysis 
when a parole officer conducts a search pursuant to the 
consent form: 
 
       A search [conducted pursuant to the form] will be 
       deemed reasonable if the totality of the evidence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Commonwealth v. Pickron, 634 A.2d 1093, 1098 (Pa. 1993), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that a parolee has limited 
Fourth Amendment rights, but held that the Fourth Amendment 
prohibited "the warrantless search of a probationer or a parolee's 
residence based upon reasonable suspicion without the consent of the 
owner or a statutory or regulatory framework governing this kind of 
search." Pickron specifically reserved the question whether an agreement 
signed by a parolee giving consent to a warrantless search could survive 
constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 1098 n.6; Williams, 692 A.2d at 1035. 
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       demonstrates: (1) that the parole officer had a 
       reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed a 
       parole violation, and (2) that the search was reasonably 
       related to the parole officer's duty. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). As such, the Williams case seems to 
be based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment (especially insofar 
as it purports to adopt the "middle ground" approach 
adopted by other states, which approach seems simply to 
require that parolees acknowledge that parole officers can 
conduct reasonable searches without a warrant, see id. at 
1037). Indeed, the Court concluded that this approach 
"comports with the Fourth Amendment protection afforded 
to parolees by the United States Supreme Court in Griffin, 
supra, and in our sister states." Id. Nevertheless, the Court 
in Williams concluded that the parole agents had 
reasonable suspicion to search the defendant, so it did not 
have to decide whether the form authorized suspicionless 
searches. See id. at 1037-38. 
 
Four months later, in Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of 
Probation & Parole, 698 A.2d 32 (1997), rev'd on other 
grounds, 524 U.S. 357 (1998), the same Court squarely 
faced the question whether a parolee is entitled to the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment in his parole 
revocation hearing when he signed a consent to search 
form as a condition of his parole. The Scott Court construed 
its decision in Williams as a decision balancing the 
interests of the government and parolees. The Court noted 
that, "[i]n deciding what effect the signing of the consent 
provision had on Williams's limited rights under the Fourth 
Amendment, we `balanc[ed] the governmental interests 
involved in granting parole and supervising parolees with 
that interest of the private individual, i.e., the parolee, 
which has been affected by the governmental action.' " 
Scott, 698 A.2d at 35 (1997) (quoting Williams, 692 A.2d at 
1035). This passage suggests that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court read its earlier decision as having been 
based on weighing of the Fourth Amendment interests 
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involved and not the meaning of the form as a matter of 
Pennsylvania law.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. When Scott was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, that 
Court noted the contention "that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
opinion was at least ambiguous as to whether it relied on state or federal 
law to determine the extent of respondent's consent . . . ." Scott v. 
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 524 U.S. 357, 362 n.3 (1998). 
 
The basis for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision had been 
debated during oral argument before the Court: 
 
       QUESTION: I'm not sure you're right in saying that the Pennsylvania 
       supreme court based its interpretation of the consent form on its 
       reading of the Fourth Amendment. I thought they might have just 
       based it on an interpretation of Pennsylvania law. 
 
       GENERAL FISHER: Mr. Chief Justice, we argue very strongly that 
       they did, in fact, interpret it based on their reading of the 
Fourth 
       Amendment, and that is where we disagree. We believe that a search 
       of a parolee's residence may be without suspicion, or a 
suspicionless 
       search. 
 
       QUESTION: Well, you--suppose this consent form were redrafted to 
       make clear that the person paroled is consenting to a search 
       without a warrant and to a search without any suspicion whatever. 
       Suppose it were drafted that way. Now, what do you think the 
       Pennsylvania courts would say to that? 
 
       GENERAL FISHER: It's--we believe that the Pennsylvania courts 
       would say, based on what they said in this case, that we could not 
       have that kind of consent form, because we believe they have-- 
 
       QUESTION:--the Fourth Amendment? 
 
       GENERAL FISHER: Because the Fourth Amendment requires 
       reasonable suspicion. 
 
       QUESTION: It just wasn't clear to me whether that's what they said, 
       because they could have meant the consent form just didn't cover 
it. 
 
       GENERAL FISHER: No, Justice O'Connor, we think they said very 
       clearly that the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion. 
 
Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, Transcript of Oral 
Argument, 1998 WL 154625 at *5-6 (Mar. 30, 1998). 
 
While this colloquy hardly resolves the issue, we set it forth for 
background and for ease of reference when this issue comes before the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as it doubtless some day will. 
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At the same time, Scott notes that "applying Williams to 
the instant case, we hold that Appellee has a Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures that is unaffected by his signing of the consent to 
search provision." 698 A.2d at 36. Although the Court does 
not explain why (i.e., whether it is interpreting Pennsylvania 
law), in our view this statement suggests that signing the 
form does not effect a waiver of any of the signatory's rights 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
The problem we have in construing the Williams  and 
Scott decisions stems from the fact that, instead of engaging 
in a two-stage analysis, asking first whether the form as a 
matter of Pennsylvania law provided for suspicionless 
searches or required reasonable suspicion, and second 
whether the form as construed under Pennsylvania law 
comported with the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not go 
beyond reasoning that under the Fourth Amendment a 
search of a parolee required reasonable suspicion, and it 
construed the form in light of that requirement. The Court 
did not independently analyze the meaning of the form as 
a matter of Pennsylvania law.7 Accordingly, we need to 
decide whether, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, Baker 
consented to a suspicionless search of his person and 
property by signing the form. 
 
By its terms, there are (at least) two possible readings of 
the Pennsylvania standard form. First, it can be understood 
to authorize suspicionless searches, because there is no 
caveat modifying the phrase "I expressly consent to the 
search of my person, property and residence" that would 
suggest that the background rule of reasonable suspicion 
applies. This interpretation does make sense of the plain 
language of the consent form and the common 
understanding of what it means to consent to a search in 
the Fourth Amendment context. Cf. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Pennsylvania follows the judicial policy that courts should not reach 
constitutional questions if they can decide a case upon non- 
constitutional grounds. See Gartner v. Commonweath, 469 A.2d 697, 700 
(Pa. 1983). However, neither the Williams nor the Scott Court explicitly 
invoked this principle as a basis for its decision. 
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U.S. 248, 251 (1991) ("The standard for measuring the 
scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment 
is that of `objective' reasonableness--what would the typical 
reasonable person have understood by the exchange 
between the officer and the suspect?") (citations omitted); 
United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 957 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Of 
course [the defendant] could have limited his consent to 
certain items, but he had the burden to express that 
limitation.") (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252). If 
Pennsylvania had adopted this interpretation, however, the 
reason for the extended discussion of reasonable suspicion 
in Williams and Scott would be unclear. 
 
The second construction of the form is that it waives only 
the warrant requirement. On this reading, the phrase"I 
expressly consent to the search of my person, property and 
residence, without a warrant" is limited in the sense that it 
waives only the warrant requirement and leaves the 
reasonable suspicion requirement in place. The difficulty 
with this position is that Griffin (which we have applied to 
searches of parolees) holds not only that reasonable 
suspicion (rather than probable cause) is the requisite level 
of suspicion for searches of probationers, but also that no 
warrant is required when conducting such searches. See 
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876-77 (holding that the special needs 
of the probation system made the warrant requirement 
impracticable); see also Hill, 967 F.2d at 910 (holding that 
in light of the special needs of a parole system, the warrant 
requirement does not apply to searches of parolees). 
 
On this interpretation, the consent to search form has no 
effect--it simply states the legal standard for searching a 
parolee that would apply even in the absence of the form. 
It is hard to understand why Pennsylvania would feel the 
need to require parolees to consent affirmatively to the 
background rule of warrantless searches, but not to 
consent affirmatively to the background rule of reasonable 
suspicion, if the form was intended simply to set forth the 
governing standards to search parolees. Nevertheless, 
Williams characterizes the parole agreement as an 
"acknowledg[ment] that agents of the Parole Board could 
conduct a warrantless search," id. at 1037, which supports 
the view that the consent form effects no waiver and serves 
only as an acknowledgment of the background rule. 
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In these circumstances, it is our job to predict what 
Pennsylvania would do if it were to construe the form solely 
as a matter of Pennsylvania law. Based on our reading of 
Pickron, 634 A.2d 1093 (Pa. 1993), and Williams, coupled 
with the tenor of the discussion in Scott, we conclude that 
Pennsylvania would construe the consent form to include 
an implicit requirement that any search be based on 
reasonable suspicion. We begin with Pickron, in which the 
Court decided that, in the absence of consent or a statutory 
or regulatory scheme authorizing suspicionless searches of 
parolees, the Fourth Amendment required reasonable 
suspicion to search parolees. That decision is consistent 
with Griffin and Hill. Then in Williams, the Court noted 
that, following Pickron, the Pennsylvania General Assembly 
enacted two statutory provisions authorizing searches of a 
parolee by state and county parole officers based on 
reasonable suspicion. See Williams, 692 A.2d at 1035 n.9 
(referring to 61 PA. Cons. Stat. SS 331.27a, 331.27b). As 
such, Pennsylvania's statutory scheme adheres to the 
reasonable suspicion rule. 
 
More significantly, nothing in Scott suggests that the 
consent form authorizes the suspicionless searches not 
provided for by the statutory scheme, and at least one 
statement suggests that the consent form is similarly 
limited. As we have noted, Scott states that"applying 
Williams to the instant case, we hold that Appellee has a 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches 
and seizures that is unaffected by his signing of the 
consent to search provision." 698 A.2d at 36. But if the 
form waived the reasonable suspicion requirement, it would 
affect a parolee's substantive rights. 
 
When engaging in a predictive exercise, as we do here, we 
sometimes must not only read the lines but also between 
the lines, as it were. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
consistent application of the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness inquiry to the consent form in Williams and 
Scott, and its repeatedly expressed concern with balancing 
the interests of the state with the privacy interests of the 
parolee, also suggest to us that that Court does not believe 
that the form authorizes suspicionless searches. Rather, 
the analysis engaged in, which focuses on the 
 
                                18 
  
reasonableness of the search, would be unnecessary if the 
form authorized a search not otherwise permitted under the 
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Williams , 692 A.2d at 1036 
("A search will be deemed reasonable if the totality of the 
evidence demonstrates: (1) that the parole officer has a 
reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed a 
parole violation, and (2) that the search was reasonably 
related to the parole officer's duty.") (citations omitted). 
Accordingly, we conclude that Pennsylvania would construe 
the standard form as requiring reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a search, and thus that the consent form that 
Baker signed did not authorize suspicionless searches of 
his person, property, or residence. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the search of 
the trunk was not founded on reasonable suspicion, and 
that the consent form did not authorize a suspicionless 
search thereof. The fruits of the search, including the 
evidence found in the search of Baker's house, must 
therefore be suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963). The order of the District Court 
denying Baker's motion to suppress will be reversed and 
the case remanded to the District Court for further action 
consistent with this opinion. 
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